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The complex and unprecedented Ebola epidemic ongoing in West Africa has highlighted the need to review the
epidemiological characteristics of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) as well as our current understanding of the transmission
dynamics and the effect of control interventions against Ebola transmission. Here we review key epidemiological
data from past Ebola outbreaks and carry out a comparative review of mathematical models of the spread and
control of Ebola in the context of past outbreaks and the ongoing epidemic in West Africa. We show that
mathematical modeling offers useful insights into the risk of a major epidemic of EVD and the assessment of the
impact of basic public health measures on disease spread. We also discuss the critical need to collect detailed
epidemiological data in real-time during the course of an ongoing epidemic, carry out further studies to estimate
the effectiveness of interventions during past outbreaks and the ongoing epidemic, and develop large-scale
modeling studies to study the spread and control of viral hemorrhagic fevers in the context of the highly
heterogeneous economic reality of African countries.
Keywords: Ebola Virus Disease, Transmission model, Control interventions, Basic reproduction number, West Africa,
Incubation, Serial interval, Case fatality ratio, Isolation, Behavior changeBackground
A complex epidemic of Zaire ebolavirus (EBOV) has been
affecting West Africa since approximately December
2013, with the first cases likely occurring in southern
Guinea [1]. The causative Ebola strain is closely related to
a strain associated with past EBOV outbreaks in Central
Africa [2] and could have been circulating in West Africa
for about a decade [2]. However, the current epidemic was
not identified until March 2014 [1], which facilitated sev-
eral transmission chains to progress essentially unchecked
in the region and to cross porous borders with neighbor-
ing Sierra Leone and Liberia and seed a limited outbreak
in Nigeria via commercial airplane on 20 July 2014 [3].
The World Health Organization declared the Ebola epi-
demic in West Africa a Public Health Emergency of Inter-
national Concern on 8 August 2014 [4], with exponential
dynamics characterizing the growth in the number of new* Correspondence: gchowell@asu.edu
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article, unless otherwise stated.cases in some areas [5-9]. Economic and sociocultural
factors together with the delay in identifying the outbreak
in urban settings have hindered a timely and effective
implementation of control efforts in the region [10,11].
Remarkably, the current size of the ongoing EBOV epi-
demic far surpasses the total number of cases reported for
all previous Ebola outbreaks combined. A total of 6,553
cases, with 3,083 deaths, have been reported to the World
Health Organization as of 23 September 2014.
A serious shortage of timely resources in the region is the
key factor responsible for the onset and disproportionate
scale of the ongoing epidemic in West Africa [11]. In
particular, the epidemic is unfolding in a region charac-
terized by limited public health infrastructure including:
(1) a lack of essential supplies to implement infection
control measures in health care settings; (2) scarcity of
health care workers and staff to manage a growing case
burden and carry out essential contact tracing activities
to find new cases quickly so that these can be effectively
isolated [12]; and (3) the absence of epidemiological sur-
veillance for the timely identification of case clusters
[13,14]. Containing the ongoing epidemic poses an unpre-
cedented challenge as the virus has moved from GuineaCentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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ders of neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone. A major
coordinated operation on the ground is needed to limit
the geographic extension of the epidemic.
The causative agent of Ebola virus disease (EVD) is an
RNA virus of the family Filoviridae and genus Ebolavirus.
Five different Ebolavirus strains have been identified,
namely Zaire ebolavirus (EBOV), Sudan ebolavirus
(SUDV), Tai Forest ebolavirus (TAFV), Bundibugyo
ebolavirus (BDBV) and Reston ebolavirus (RESTV),
with fruit bats considered as the most likely reservoir
host [15]. The great majority of past Ebola outbreaks
in humans have been linked to three Ebola strains:
EBOV, SUDV and BDBV [16]. The Ebola virus, EBOV,
(formerly designated Zaire ebolavirus), the deadliest
of the five Ebolavirus strains, was first identified in
1976 in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo)
and its name was derived from the Ebola River located
near the source of the first outbreak. Past Ebola outbreaks
have been reported on average every 1.5 years [17], with a
total of 7 prior outbreaks generating over 100 reported
cases [18]. A recent study has estimated 22 million people
distributed in areas of Central and West Africa to be at
risk of Ebola [19].
Ebola is characterized by a high case fatality ratio which
was nearly 90% in a past outbreak [20]. After an incubation
period mostly ranging from 2 to 21 days, nonspecific symp-
toms appear, including sudden onset of fever, weakness,
vomiting, diarrhea, headache and a sore throat. A fraction
of patients may later develop severe internal and external
hemorrhagic manifestations and experience multiple organ
failures [21]. Except for RESTV, all other Ebola strains are
pathogenic to humans. Human outbreaks may stem from
direct human exposure to fruit bats or intermediate in-
fected hosts that primarily comprise non-human primates
(that is, gorillas, chimpanzees and monkeys). Human epi-
demics subsequently take off by direct human-to-human
contact via bodily fluids or indirect contact with contami-
nated surfaces. Hence, stopping Ebola transmission should
be feasible when the cases are detected early and managed
properly, because this virus is not transmitted through the
air or water [22]. Nevertheless, Ebola has been shown to
spread through the air under carefully controlled laboratory
conditions [23]. Hence, amplification of human-to-human
transmission can result in the presence of suboptimal infec-
tion control measures in healthcare settings [24-26]. Unsafe
burials that involve direct contact with Ebola-infected
bodies also pose a major infection risk [20].
A review of key epidemiological parameters of EVD and
our current understanding of the transmission dynamics
and the effect of basic control interventions against this
disease would be useful for guiding and assessing the
potential effectiveness of control interventions during
Ebola outbreaks. Specifically, here we review epidemiologicaldata from past Ebola outbreaks including the basic
reproduction number, the serial interval and the case
fatality ratio. Subsequently, we carry out a comparative
review of mathematical models of the spread and con-
trol of Ebola in the context of past and the ongoing
epidemic in West Africa. We show that mathematical
modeling offers useful insights into the risk of a major
epidemic of EVD and the assessment of the impact of
basic public health measures on disease spread. We
illustrate the effects of demographic characteristics,
such as the effective population size, size of spillover
event (for example, details of initial conditions), baseline
infection control measures in health care settings, and
the timing of initiation of control interventions includ-
ing enhancing the effectiveness of isolating infectious
individuals, contact tracing to bring infectious individuals
into isolation and social distancing interventions in
the community.
Natural history parameters of EVD
Due to the relatively few past Ebola outbreaks, available
epidemiological data to infer the natural history parameters
of EVD remain limited. Moreover, past outbreaks have been
caused by different virus strains, making it difficult to judge
whether a certain observed epidemiological character-
istic is unique to the causative strain. Here, we extract
published evidence and review Ebola epidemiological
parameters from the literature, integrating estimates of
the basic reproduction number, the asymptomatic ra-
tio, the incubation period, the latent period, the symp-
tomatic period, the infectious period, the serial interval
and the case fatality ratio.
The basic reproduction number, R0
The basic reproduction number, R0, is interpreted as the
average number of secondary cases caused by a typical
infected individual throughout its entire course of infection
in a completely susceptible population and in the absence
of control interventions [27,28]. In the context of a partially
susceptible population owing to prior exposure or vaccin-
ation, the (effective) reproduction number, R, quantifies
the potential for infectious disease transmission. If R <1,
transmission chains are not self-sustaining and are unable
to generate a major epidemic. By contrast, an epidemic
is likely to occur whenever R >1. When measured over
time t, the effective reproduction number Rt, can be
helpful to quantify the time-dependent transmission
potential and evaluate the effect of control interven-
tions in almost ‘real time’ [29]. In summary, R0 is
regarded as a summary measure of the transmissibility
of infectious diseases, playing a key role in determining
the required control effort (for example, intensity of
quarantine and isolation strategies). R0 could also be
useful for guiding the numbers of antivirals and
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whenever these are available.
R0 estimates for prior Ebola outbreaks in Central Africa
R0 has been estimated for prior EVD outbreaks in Central
Africa using mathematical modeling and epidemiological
data for two Ebola outbreaks, namely the 1995 outbreak
in Democratic Republic of Congo and the 2000 Uganda
outbreak, respectively [30,31]. Unlike the ongoing epidemic
in West Africa, past outbreaks in Central Africa have been
confined to relatively rural and isolated areas without
spreading to urban sectors which facilitated the effective im-
plementation of control interventions. Using a homogenous
mixing SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Removed)
model that accounted for a gradual decay in the transmis-
sion rate at the start of interventions, Chowell et al. [32]
estimated R0 at 1.83 for Congo and 1.34 for Uganda. Using
the same epidemic model but employing a Bayesian esti-
mation method, Lekone and Finkenstadt [33] estimated
slightly lower values at 1.33 to 1.35 for the outbreak in
Uganda. Legrand et al. employed a different modeling
approach [19]: while allowing for homogeneous mixing, the
study took into account three different transmission
settings, that is, transmissions in community, hospital
settings and during funerals. R0 was estimated at 2.7 for
Congo, 1995 and 2.7 for Uganda, 2000, but estimates
showed substantial uncertainty. Transmission from burials
alone accounted for 1.8 secondary transmissions in Congo
while community transmission in Uganda accounted for
2.6 secondary transmissions. Variability in R0 estimates
across studies can be attributed to differences in model
structure and underlying assumptions.
An assessment of R0 based on the growth rate of the 2014
Ebola epidemic in West Africa
A quick look at the ongoing epidemic in West Africa
without delving into a too detailed analysis permits us
to grasp the level of R0 for the ongoing Ebola outbreak.
Assuming that the early epidemic data in Sierra Leone
and Liberia are sufficient to be characterized by expo-
nential growth dynamics, with growth rate r, the inci-
dence (that is, the number of new cases at calendar
time t) is modeled as
i tð Þ ¼ k exp rtð Þ;
where k is a constant. As the observed data are cumulative
I(t), we integrate the above equation from the starting time
of exponential growth t0 to the latest time t, that is,
I tð Þ ¼ k
r
exp rtð Þ−exp rt0ð Þ½ :
It should be noted that the cumulative number of
cases does not follow a single exponential growth term.Assuming that the observed number of cases is Poisson
distributed, the maximum likelihood estimate for r for
Liberia is estimated at 0.053 (95% confidence interval
(CI): 0.051, 0.055). The growth rate in Sierra Leone is
largely divided into two phases with a greater growth
rate in the early phase (which could reflect initial case
clusters in hospital settings). Hence, r is estimated at 0.085
(95% CI: 0.080, 0.090) and 0.021 (95% CI: 0.019, 0.023) for
the early and late phases, respectively (Figure 1a). Assuming
that the mean generation time is 12 days (with standard
deviation 5.2 days) based on contact tracing data from an
outbreak in Uganda 2000 [34] (see below), R0 for Liberia is
estimated at 1.96 (95% CI: 1.92, 2.01). For Sierra Leone, R0
is 3.07 (95% CI: 2.85, 3.32) and 1.30 (95% CI: 1.26, 1.33) for
the early and late phases, respectively (Figure 1b). Estimates
in Liberia and the late phase of Sierra Leone are roughly
consistent with those published by Chowell et al. [30].
A comparison of the growth trends for past outbreaks
in Central Africa (Congo 1995 and Uganda 2000) with
the ongoing epidemic in Liberia is shown in Figure 2.
Mathematical modeling studies of the 2014 Ebola epidemic
in West Africa
Recent studies have started to shed light on the transmis-
sion potential of the ongoing EVD epidemic. Specifically,
three studies have estimated the basic reproduction num-
ber of EVD in the range of 1.5 to 2.5 [8,9,35]. Althaus [8]
employed an SEIR model with the time-dependency of the
reproduction number to capture effects of control interven-
tions, following the model by Chowell et al. [18]; analyzing
the country-specific data independently for each country,
the estimates were 1.5 for Guinea, 2.5 for Sierra Leone
and 1.6 for Liberia [8]. Gomes et al. [35] explicitly
accounted for the risk of international spread, and the
basic reproduction number ranged from 1.5 to 2.0.
More importantly, this study employed a global epidemic
model with mobility data, indicating that the short-term
risk of international spread to outside Africa is small and
that the expansion of the ongoing epidemic is more likely
to occur in African countries [35]. Moreover, Fisman et al.
estimated R0 at 1.8 using a two-parameter mathematical
model that describes the epidemic growth and control [9].
Real-time estimation of the effective (time-dependent)
reproduction number revealed estimates in line with R0
estimates derived from other studies. For instance, by
measuring temporal variations in the epidemic growth rate
during periods of epidemic growth, the reproduction num-
ber was approximated based on a classic formula of R0 for
the SEIR model, which provided estimates in the range
of 1.4 to 1.9 [36]. A different modeling study accounted
for both local transmission and transnational spread across
severely affected countries using a multivariate renewal
process model which allowed the derivation of global and
country-specific estimates of the reproduction number [7].
a b
Figure 1 Early transmission dynamics of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in Sierra Leone and Liberia, 2014. a) The cumulative number of
confirmed and probable cases of EVD as a function of calendar time [3]. Filled circles represent cases in Liberia, while unfilled triangles represent
cases in Sierra Leone. The solid line shows the exponential growth fit to the incidence curve in Liberia. The dashed line is the exponential fit to
the early phase in Sierra Leone (up to 8 July 2014), while the dotted line shows the exponential fit to the later phase in the same country. b) The
relationship between the exponential growth rate and the corresponding reproduction number for EVD based on a Weibull distributed generation
time with shape and scale parameters of 2.59 and 13.60, respectively. Arrows indicate the uncertainty range (95% confidence interval) of the
exponential growth rate estimated from the corresponding epidemic data.
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Rt from June to August 2014 ranged from 1.4 to 1.7 in
Sierra Leone and Liberia. Hence, control could be
reached by halting over half of the secondary transmissions
per primary case whenever the reproduction number is
below 2 [7]. Moreover, it is worth noting that the exponen-
tial growth in Ebola incidence is placing great pressure on
healthcare facilities, which could affect time- and space-
dependent variations in transmission dynamics and the
surveillance system [37]. The analysis of available data
using mathematical modeling should, therefore, carefully
assess the quality and consistency of the surveillance
system employed to collect epidemiological data. Hence,
mathematical models should ideally be tied to charac-
teristics of the surveillance system as much as possible
to avoid potential bias [38].
Comparing R0 with other infectious diseases
For comparison with other filoviruses, the R0 for the 2005
Marburg Fever Outbreak in Angola has been consistently
estimated at 1.6 using two different statistical modeling
approaches [39,40]. For comparison with other infectious
diseases transmitted by direct contact, R0 has been es-
timated at 2.6 for an outbreak of acute hemorrhagic
conjunctivitis in Mexico [41]. In contrast, for respira-
tory infections, the reproduction number has been es-
timated for the SARS outbreaks in 2003 in the range
2.2 to 3.7 based on fitting transmission models to theprogression of weekly cases prior to the start of control
interventions [42,43], in the range 1.2 to 1.6 for seasonal
influenza [44], 1.4 to 5.2 for influenza pandemics [45-50],
15 for pertussis, 17 for measles [27] and 1.2 to 1.3 for
meningococcal meningitis [51].
Asymptomatic infection and incubation period
Asymptomatic infection with Ebola virus is known to
occur in a certain fraction of exposed individuals [52]. By
analyzing the antibody responses among 24 asymptomatic
close contacts of symptomatic patients, Leroy et al. found
that 11 (45.8%) developed both immunoblobulin M (IgM)
and IgG responses to Ebola antigens. However, the study
subjects were only those who experienced close contacts,
and an estimate of asymptomatic ratio for the general
population was not obtained. The majority of cases devel-
oped illness 6 to 11 days after infection. A classical study
of the Zaire strain [53] indicated that the mean incubation
period, that is, the mean length of time from infection to
illness onset, is 6.3 days with the 95% quantile 21 days. Re-
analyzing the data set of household contacts during the
Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo in
1995, Eichner et al. estimated the mean incubation period
at 12.7 days (with standard deviation 4.31 days) [54]. The
fitted lognormal distribution is redrawn in Figure 3a. By
taking the 99 percentile point as the length of quarantine,
Eichner et al. argues for movement restrictions of exposed
healthy individuals for 25 days. Based on data for the first






















Figure 2 Comparison of the growth trends for past outbreaks in Central Africa (Congo 1995 and Uganda 2000) with the ongoing
Ebola epidemic in Liberia. Time series of new Ebola case reports prior to the implementation of control interventions for the outbreak in
Congo 1995 (9 May 1995) [24] and Uganda 2000 (22 October 2000) [100] and for the ongoing epidemic in Liberia from 15 June to 15 August
2014. Incidence data for the outbreaks in Central Africa are shown according to the dates of symptoms onset while the weekly incidence curve
for the epidemic in Liberia comprises total cases based on the daily epidemic curve estimated in [7].
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estimated the mean incubation period at 11.4 days with
no significant variation across the affected West African
countries [6].
The serial interval
The serial interval defined as the time from illness onset
in the primary case to illness onset in the secondary case
[55], has been relatively well observed for EVD based on
household or contact-tracing studies. A household study
during the outbreak in DRC indicated that the minimum
serial interval was 7 days, while the maximum was 17
days [56]. Findings based on contact tracing data for the
outbreak in Uganda in 2000 were roughly consistent
with those derived from household data [34]: mean (SD)
and median (quartiles) estimates for the serial interval
were 12.0 (5.2) and 11.5 (8 to 17) days, respectively.Figure 3b shows the serial-interval distribution along
with a fitted Weibull distribution with scale and shape
parameters estimated at 13.6 (95% CI: 11.4, 16.1) and 2.6
(95% CI: 1.8, 3.5), respectively. The Cramér-von Mises
goodness-of-fit test did not reveal significant deviations
between the observed data and fitted model distribution
(W2 = 0.05, P =0.25). This estimate is in good agreement
with that derived from data of the first 9 months of the
ongoing epidemic in West Africa, which has been esti-
mated at 15.3 ± (SD =9.3) days [6]. This distribution is
key to quantifying the reproduction number using the
exponential growth rate of cases during the early stage
of an epidemic, because the conversion from the growth
rate of cases to the reproduction number requires esti-
mates of the generation time distribution [57] which is
known to be informed by the serial interval and the incu-
bation period [58].
Figure 3 Incubation period and generation time of Ebola virus disease (EVD). a) The probability density function of the incubation period,
that is, the time from infection to illness onset, fitted to a lognormal distribution is shown. The mean and the standard deviation are 12.7 and 4.3
days, respectively [54]. b) The generation time distribution, as collected from contact tracing data during the Ebola outbreak in Uganda, 2000, is
fitted to a Weibull distribution. The mean and the standard deviation are 12.0 and 5.2 days, respectively.
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Other parameters associated with the time course of EVD
have not been rigorously ascertained. However, according
to Bayesian model-based estimates from a past Ebola out-
break [33], the mean latent and infectious periods have
been estimated at 9.4 and 5.7 days, respectively, using a
vague prior and 10.1 and 6.5 days, respectively, for an
informative prior. These exponential distributions based
on a mathematical modeling study are the only available
empirical evidence for these two time periods. The mean
length of time from illness onset to death is approxi-
mately 10 days [24,56], but the transmissibility from
the deceased from Ebola may account for a certain
fraction of secondary transmissions [19]. Hence, the
infectious period could be longer than the observable
time to death if the burial is extended.
The case fatality ratio
The case fatality ratio (CFR) is calculated as the proportion
of deaths among the total number of EVD cases, thereby
informing the virulence of the infectious pathogen. EVD
can be fatal, but it is important to note that the CFR being
‘almost 100%’ for EVD in general does not rest on any em-
pirical arguments. For the well documented outbreaks of
Ebola (excluding only isolated cases who are likely to have
acquired infection from animal contact), the expected value
of CFR has always been below 90% [31], with the range
from 41% to 89%. The so-called Zaire strain is considered
to be slightly more fatal than the Sudan strain. While the
CFR for the Sudan strain ranges from 41% to 65%, the CFR
for the Zaire strain ranges from 61% to 89%. Consideringthat the corresponding quartile for the Zaire strain, as
determined by the distribution of outbreak-specific
estimates, ranges from 73.3% to 84.3%, the CFR of the
ongoing epidemic among cases with definitive recorded
clinical outcomes for Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone has
been consistently estimated at 70.8% (95% CI: 68.6 to 72.8),
which is in good agreement with estimates from prior
outbreaks. Nevertheless, it must be noted that earlier
studies have not addressed ascertainment bias. It is im-
portant to follow up the reasons why the estimated 53%
(as of 31 August 2014 which involved an underestimation
bias due to time delay from illness onset to death) in real-
time has been much lower than the published estimate of
70.8% among a portion of cases. Given the potential pres-
ence of asymptomatic cases, addressing ascertainment error
may be the key to appropriately capture the disease
burden for the entire population. Table 1 summarizes
key epidemiological parameters for EVD.
Models of Ebola transmission dynamics and control
The transmission dynamics of Ebola outbreaks in confined
settings in Central Africa have been previously described
using an SEIR epidemiological model [30] with the goal of
quantifying the effects of social distancing interventions.
In this model, the time-dependent transmission rate
parameter β(t) captures the effects of implementing
basic public health interventions over time. For instance,
once interventions are put in place τ days after the onset
of the outbreak, the time-dependent transmission rate
could be modeled to shift from a ‘free course’ baseline
value β0 to a value β1, where β1 < β0. More realistically,
Table 1 Summary of empirical estimates of epidemiological
parameters for Ebola virus disease (EVD)
Description Value Reference
Incubation period 12.7 days (mean) [54]
Latent period 10.1 days (mean) [33]
Infectious period 6.5 days (mean) [33]
Serial interval 12.0 days (mean) [34]
Generation time 16.6 days (mean) [34]
Time from illness onset to death 10 days (mean) [24,56]
Case fatality ratio 41% to 65% (Sudan) [31]
61% to 89% (Zaire)
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not seen immediately but gradually takes hold in the
population, as modeled in [30]. In these models, the
basic reproduction number, R0, in a completely suscep-
tible population and in the absence of control inter-
ventions is computed as the product of the mean
transmission rate during the intervention-free course
of the outbreak, β0, and the mean infectious period, 1/γ.
Hence, R0 is given by:
R0 ¼ β0=γ
More detailed epidemiological data and information
about the contributions of different settings to transmission
could guide the design of more elaborate models that could
be helpful to quantify the effects of more specific interven-
tion strategies. Legrand et al. [31] developed a structured
transmission model to describe Ebola epidemics with con-
tributions to the force of infection from the community,
funerals and healthcare settings. The most distinctive
feature of this model is that transmission during burial
rituals is modeled by accounting for the duration of
the burial and the intensity of transmission with infec-
tious bodies. This model is comprised by six epidemio-
logically relevant states and thirteen parameters. The
model was calibrated to data of the Ebola outbreaks in
the Republic of Congo in 1995 and Uganda in 2000 by
fitting three transmission rate parameters, one for each
transmission setting and one parameter to quantify the
effectiveness of interventions. The full model can be
applied to the West African epidemic particularly for
Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia where burial prac-
tices involve the touching of bodies of the deceased
[59]. But this feature is believed to be less influential in
transmission in the context of Nigeria where a limited
outbreak developed. To illustrate the effects of control
interventions during Ebola outbreaks, here we only account
for transmission in the community and in healthcare
settings by adjusting baseline transmission rates, diagnos-
tic rates and enhancement of infection-control measures(for example, strict use of protective equipment by health-
care workers and effective isolation of infectious individuals)
(see for example, [27,28,42,43,60,61]). In this simpler setting,
the population is divided into five categories: suscep-
tible individuals (S); exposed individuals (E); infectious
and symptomatic individuals (I); hospitalized individuals
(H); and removed individuals after recovery or disease-
induced death (R).
Susceptible individuals infected through contact with
infectious individuals (secondary cases) enter the latent
period at rate β(t) (I + l(t) H) /N(t) where β(t) is the mean
human-to-human transmission rate per day, l(t) quantifies
the relative transmissibility of hospitalized patients com-
pared to symptomatic patients in the community, and N
(t) is the total population size at time t. Thus, values of l(t)
between 0 and 1 would reflect the effectiveness of hospital
isolation measures that decrease Ebola transmission prob-
ability below that seen in the community, and values above
1.0 denote increased transmission in the hospital relative to
the community, potentially due to biological and/or epi-
demiological reasons (for example, exposure to body fluids).
Symptomatic infectious individuals I are hospitalized at the
time-dependent average rate γa(t) or recover without being
hospitalized at the average rate γI. Individuals in the
‘removed’ class do not contribute to the transmission
process. For simplicity, one can assume that the time-
dependent transmission rate β(t), relatively transmissi-
bility of hospitalized patients, l(t), and the diagnostic
rate γa(t), remain constant values at β0, l0, and γa0 prior
to the implementation of comprehensive countermea-
sures. Hence, in this model the basic reproduction
number, R0, is given by the following expression:
R0 ¼ β0 1= γa0 þ γI
 þ l0 1=γrð Þ γa0= γa0 þ γI
   
:
In this equation, (1/(γa0 + γI) is the mean infectious
period of community cases, γa0 /(γa0 + γI) is the fraction
of symptomatic cases that are hospitalized, and 1/γr is
the mean infectious period of hospitalized cases. This
expression can be decomposed as the sum of the contri-
butions of infectious individuals in the community and
the hospital as follows:
R0 ¼ Rcomm þ Rhosp
where Rcomm = β0 /(γa0 + γI) and
Rhosp = β0 l0 (1/γr)(γa0 /(γa0 + γI)).
Importantly, the above components for the reproduction
number underscore the fact that the actual reproduction
number could vary across regions as a function of the
local capacity public health context (for example, in-
fection control practices and availability of personal
protective equipment for health care workers) and any
local cultural practices that may influence transmission
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may be very unlikely to unfold in developed countries
simply as a result of baseline infection control measures
in place (that is, R0 < 1) whereas poor countries with
extremely weak or absent public health systems may be
unable to control an Ebola outbreak (that is, R0 > 1).
This suggests that local socioeconomic and sociocultural
conditions are key determinants of disease spread, particu-
larly in the context of the transmission dynamics of EVD.
The impact of infection-control measures in health care
settings is illustrated in Figure 4 for different initial values
of baseline R0. The combined effect of the effectiveness of
isolation measures and the diagnostic rate of symptomatic
individuals on R0 is given in Figure 5.
Initial transmission dynamics
The natural reservoir hosts of the Ebola virus have yet
to be confirmed [62,63], but laboratory studies point to
fruit bats as the most likely culprit harboring the Ebola
virus in the natural habitat [63-66]. Ebola outbreaks among
humans have been associated with direct exposure to fruit
bats and mortality among other wild animals, which tend
to succumb to the infection [67-69]. Epidemiological data
support the notion that spillover events of Ebola virus from























Figure 4 The effects of isolation strategies on R0. Basic reproduction nu
settings for three different baseline values of R0: 1.3, 1.5 and 1.8. Epidemiolo
from symptoms onset to diagnosis (γa0) is assumed to be three days. The i
infectiousness of infectious individuals in health care settings. Baseline valu
a given R0. EVD, Ebola virus disease; R0, basic reproduction number. Three lhost, such as non-human primates, into human popula-
tions occur with a certain frequency (for example, [70,71]),
but only a small number of those introductions are ever
correctly diagnosed and reported or successfully unfold
human-to-human transmission chains that lead to out-
breaks. This hinders our understanding of the frequency of
spillover events as a function of time (for example, season)
and its relationship with variation in climatological or
socioeconomic variables. We note that two studies have
associated the onset of Ebola outbreaks with climatological
variables [72,73]. Specifically, Pinzon et al. reported
evidence that Ebola outbreaks are correlated with dras-
tic shifts from dry to wet conditions [72] while a more
recent study by Ng et al. found lower temperature and
higher absolute humidity associated with the onset of
EVD outbreaks during 1976 to 2014 [73].
In the context of the ongoing Ebola epidemic in West
Africa, a recent study suggests that people in Sierra Leone
have been previously exposed to the Ebola virus, but those
introductions have not sparked major epidemics [2,71].
Moreover, the ongoing epidemic may have been triggered
by a single spillover event as suggested by limited epi-
demiological data indicating that chains of transmis-
sion of reported cases can be traced back to one or two
individuals [74]. This may be explained by the fact that0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
 effectiveness
mber as a function of level of isolation effectiveness in health care
gical parameter values for EVD are shown in Table 1. The mean time
solation effectiveness is given by 100*(1-l0) where l0 is the relative
es of R0 are calibrated by adjusting the transmission rate β to achieve
ines represent results for three baseline values of R0: 1.3, 1.5 and 1.8.







































Figure 5 The effects of isolation strategies and diagnostic rate on R0. Basic reproduction number as a function of the combined effect of
the level of isolation effectiveness and the diagnostic rate. Epidemiological mean parameter values for EVD are shown in Table 1. The mean time
from symptoms onset to diagnosis (γa0) is varied from one to three days. The isolation effectiveness is given by 100*(1-l0) where l0 is the relative
infectiousness of infectious individuals in health care settings. The baseline value of R0 is set at 1.8. EVD, Ebola virus disease; R0, basic
reproduction number.
Chowell and Nishiura BMC Medicine 2014, 12:196 Page 9 of 16
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/12/196Ebola introductions have historically tended to occur
in remote, rural areas with sparse population structures
characterized by higher disease extinction rates [75,76]. By
contrast, the unprecedented size of the ongoing epidemic
could have benefited from high population mobility across
invisible borders, super spreading events [2] and sec-
ondary transmissions linked to health care settings
[77]. Figure 6 illustrates the role of the size of spillover
events (for example, the number of infectious cases
initially introduced in the population) in triggering
Ebola epidemics in naive populations by showing that the
probability that a major epidemic occurs rapidly increases
as a function of the initial number of Ebola cases. For
instance, single-case introductions go extinct without de-
veloping into epidemics more than 60% of the time while
five-case introductions lead to major epidemics more than
90% of the time.
Delays in outbreak detection
Several factors hamper the timely identification of Ebola
outbreaks in Africa. First, only a small number of Ebola
outbreaks have occurred in East and Central Africa since
the first identified outbreak in 1976 relative to the re-
gional burden of other endemic infectious diseases,
such as malaria. Moreover, some areas at risk of Ebolahave yet to experience Ebola outbreaks, which severely
limits community-level knowledge of the disease. For
instance, the ongoing 2014 epidemic of EVOB is re-
portedly the first to occur in West Africa [10]. Second,
early symptoms of Ebola virus disease tend to be non-
specific (for example, many cases are only febrile) [24],
which increases the likelihood of misdiagnosing Ebola
with malaria or other locally endemic infectious diseases
[13]. Unsuccessful treatment of febrile patients and/or the
appearance of more specific symptoms during the course
of the disease (for example, hemorrhagic manifestations)
could increase the likelihood of an ‘astute’ public-health
worker suspecting Ebola or other viral hemorrhagic fever
[78]. Third, lack of epidemiological surveillance systems
and diagnostic testing in poor countries further exacerbates
the delay in detecting outbreaks. Consequently, the imple-
mentation of public health interventions may not start until
case or death clusters start to be detected and investigated
in the community by public health authorities. In general,
the longer the delay in the implementation of control inter-
ventions, the higher the chances that the virus percolates
from remote and sparsely populated areas into areas of
high population density. The probability of observing
major Ebola outbreaks is highly sensitive to the timing of
initiation of control interventions as illustrated in Figure 7.





























Figure 6 The effects of size of spillover event on the likelihood of observing an outbreak. Probability that no major outbreak unfolds as a
function of the initial number of infectious cases introduced into the population. Epidemiological parameter values for EVD are shown in Table 1.
The mean time from symptoms onset to diagnosis (γa0) is set at three days. The isolation effectiveness is set at 0 (that is, l0. =1). Population size N
is set at 100,000. The baseline value of R0 is set at 1.8. The curve corresponds to the mean of the results obtained from 500 model simulations.
EVD, Ebola virus disease; R0, basic reproduction number.
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/12/196This figure shows that a five-day delay is highly unlikely to
result in major Ebola outbreaks. By contrast, more signifi-
cant delays exceeding two weeks are likely to lead to Ebola
outbreaks (Figure 7).
Lack of public health infrastructure
Basic infection control measures in health care settings
are essential to avoid further spread of the disease to other
patients, health care workers and visitors. Unfortunately,
under-resourced African regions not only suffer from a
critically low ratio of health-care workers to total popula-
tion, but also lack essential personal protective equipment
(PPE) (for example, gloves, gowns, face masks) to practice
standard infection control measures. They also often
lack the infrastructure and local capacity necessary to
effectively trace contacts and isolate infectious individuals.
Consequently, it is not surprising that Ebola outbreaks
have been amplified in health care settings [24,25,79,80]
including the ongoing epidemic in West Africa. Indeed, a
total of 375 health care workers have developed EVD as of
23 September 2014 [81]. Fortunately, past experience also
indicates that early and drastic enhancement of infection
control measures in health care settings can substantially
reduce the size and geographic scope of Ebola outbreaks[82,83]. For instance, Figure 8 shows that the rising trend
in infected health care workers during the1995 Ebola
outbreak in Congo rapidly declined following the imple-
mentation of control interventions. The combined impact
of the rate of diagnosing symptomatic cases and the relative
infectiousness of hospitalized cases on the probability of
observing major epidemics is illustrated in Figure 9.
Socio-cultural factors
Socio-cultural factors have not only contributed sig-
nificantly to Ebola spread, but have also complicated
the implementation of control interventions. Specific-
ally, cultural practices involving touching the body of
the deceased naturally (and greatly) contribute to the
dissemination of the Ebola virus [59]. In particular, the
potential for transmission to neighboring and distant
areas by exposed funeral attendants could facilitate the
development of major epidemics [1,31]. Moreover, the
lack of prior experience or knowledge of the disease
can lead communities to deny its existence and to as-
sociate illness with witchcraft or conspiracy theories
presumably created by governments to gain control of
populations or attract resources from the international
community [77,80]. For instance, during the ongoing
Figure 7 The effects of size of baseline isolation effectiveness and timing of control interventions on the likelihood of observing an
outbreak. Probability that no major epidemic unfolds as a function of isolation effectiveness and timing of implementation of control
interventions. Epidemiological parameter values for EVD are shown in Table 1. The mean time from symptoms onset to diagnosis (γa0) is set at
three days. The relative infectiousness of hospitalized cases is given by l0. Population size N is set at 100,000. The baseline value of R0 is set at 1.8
by adjusting the transmission rate. After the start of interventions, the transmission rate is reduced by 80% and the relative infectiousness of
hospitalized individuals is reduced by 95% (that is, l0 = 1, l1 = 0.05). The curves shown correspond to the mean of the results obtained from 500
model simulations. EVD, Ebola virus disease; R0, basic reproduction number.
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/12/196epidemic in West Africa, a group of individuals looted
equipment and potentially contaminated materials in
an isolation facility in a quarantined neighborhood
[84]. Finally, the stigma carried by Ebola survivors and
family members of Ebola victims could exacerbate dis-
ease spread. In particular, uninformed families tend to
hide relatives and friends infected with Ebola to avoid
being shunned by their own communities, which en-
hances transmission rates [85]. The problem is com-
pounded by the high case fatality ratio of EVD whereby
misinformed communities tend to associate case isola-
tion with a death sentence.
Future directions and conclusions
The ongoing epidemic in West Africa offers a unique
opportunity to improve our current understanding of
the transmission characteristics of EVD in humans, in-
cluding the duration of immunity among Ebola survivors
and the case fatality ratio in the presence or absence ofsupportive therapy [86,87], as well as the effectiveness
of various control interventions [37]. For this purpose,
there is a critical need to collect detailed epidemio-
logical data in real-time during the ongoing epidemic
through the establishment of efficient epidemiological
surveillance systems in the affected areas. In addition,
we cannot overemphasize the importance of collecting
data relating to population behaviors influencing disease
spread and control and how these have changed over
time. It would also be important to record the level of
adoption of preventive and social distancing measures
in the community and adherence to infection control
measures in health care settings. Detailed data regarding
control interventions would also be critical to assess
their effectiveness in reducing secondary transmissions
including information on the changing numbers of isola-
tion and treatment centers, healthcare workers, intensity













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8 The impact of Ebola on health care workers during the 1995 Ebola outbreak in The Republic of Congo. Stacked bar plot of the
epidemic curve of the 1995 Ebola outbreak in Republic of Congo to show the contributions of community and health-care worker cases. (left)
Remarkably, the number of health care workers affected reached about 27% of the total number of reported Ebola cases. The vertical dashed line
indicates the start of control interventions. The cumulative numbers of total cases (black stars) and of health care workers (blue circles) in
logarithmic scale reveal a similar growth rate for both epidemic curves (right). Data were adapted from [24].
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/12/196There is a scarcity of empirical studies quantifying
transmission and the effects of control interventions
implemented during past Ebola outbreaks [30,31]. Further
work is also needed to quantify the effects of various
interventions put in place during the ongoing epidemic
in West Africa. Specifically, careful mathematical and
statistical modeling studies could help ascertain the
role of social distancing interventions (for example, school
closures and cancellation of mass gathering events), infec-
tion control measures in health care settings (for example,
isolation and other infection control measures among
health care workers) and contact tracing and quaran-
tine efforts [42,43,61,88-92]. In addition to individual
epidemiological data, the timing of such interventions
should be recorded along with the scale and extent of
interventions (for example, closure of class rooms or entire
schools). Intervention studies could reveal, for instance,
whether effective infection control mechanisms in hospital
settings could suffice to bring an epidemic under control
or whether a combination of control strategies would be
critical to ensure epidemic control (for example, R <1).
While a significant number of computational models
have been developed to inform preparedness plans against
pandemic influenza [93-95], comprehensive modeling stud-
ies to examine the spread and control of viral hemorrhagic
fevers, including Ebola, in the context of the highly het-
erogeneous economic reality of African countries are
yet to be developed. The shortage of modeling efforts
could be explained by the fact that large Ebola outbreaksaffecting large population settings were largely unexpected
until now. To start filling this gap, datasets comprising
detailed demographic, socio-economic, contact rates and
population mobility estimates in the region (for example,
commuting networks, air traffic) need to be integrated.
Given that the disease is highly fatal, dynamic features of
contact and mobility should also be closely investigated.
Modeling studies with local demographic characteristics
and human movement could be useful not only to assess
the likelihood of major epidemics and carry out sensible
projections on epidemic outcomes, but also to guide
control efforts in the field, such as the estimation of
the number, size and location of isolation facilities, the
number of health workers and staff and essential sup-
plies that would be needed to respond to a particular
outbreak scenario as well as to quantify the effects of
potential quarantine efforts in certain areas, border
closures and air travel restrictions.
Proven treatments or vaccines against Ebola are still
not available. Hence, our current working toolbox
available to control the spread of Ebola still hinges on
supportive medical care to increase the survival of
those infected and basic non-pharmaceutical public
health measures [96] to prevent transmission, namely:
1) infection control measures including standard precau-
tions in health care settings; 2) rapid contact tracing and
isolation of infectious individuals; and 3) social distancing
interventions in the community which may include the
dissemination of awareness campaigns to inform the
Figure 9 The effects of size of baseline isolation effectiveness and diagnostic rate on the likelihood of observing an outbreak.
Probability that no major epidemic unfolds as a function of isolation effectiveness and time from symptoms onset to diagnosis. Epidemiological
parameter values for EVD are shown in Table 1. The mean time from symptoms onset to diagnosis (γa0) is set at one, two and three days. The
relative infectiousness of hospitalized cases (l0) is varied from 0 to 1. Population size N is set at 100,000. The baseline value of R0 is set at 1.8 by
adjusting the transmission rate. The curves shown correspond to the mean of the results obtained from 500 model simulations. EVD, Ebola virus
disease; R0, basic reproduction number.
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/12/196population on how to avoid contracting the disease,
quarantining individuals potentially exposed to infectious
individuals and restricting the movement of communities
exhibiting local transmission to prevent onward trans-
mission. These actions must be conducted in close col-
laboration with local community leaders to effectively
reach the population at large. With the ongoing epidemic
in West Africa, the development of treatments and vaccines
against Ebola is accelerating [96,97]. For instance, emer-
gency use of a trickle of doses of an experimental drug
with unknown efficacy or safety record in humans has
been initiated during the outbreak [97]. Recent experi-
ments in monkeys provide promising evidence that
this experimental drug could have a significant impact
on mortality burden during Ebola outbreaks [98]. Fur-
thermore, a promising bivalent Ebola vaccine againstthe Zaire and Sudan Ebola strains is entering human
safety trials in September 2014 [99] with an initial goal
of building a stockpile of 10,000 doses by November
2014. Nevertheless, apart from pharmaceutical effects
on the prognosis of infection, we have yet to examine
how medication changes the transmission dynamics.
Hence, careful studies could be useful for assessing the
impacts of treatment on contact, transmission and diag-
nosis as well as on the disease burden [100]. If an Ebola
vaccine is developed successfully, one could assess the
effectiveness of pre-emptive and reactive treatment and
vaccination plans in the context of limited stockpiles.
Finally, it is worth noting that our efforts to prepare
against current and future infectious disease threats
should also include potential deliberate attempts to
trigger epidemics, which are largely unexpected events
Chowell and Nishiura BMC Medicine 2014, 12:196 Page 14 of 16
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/12/196but could pose high impact on public health and global
economic activities.
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